Introduction
The U.S. bond market is the largest market in the world, with a total current value of over $10 trillion--up approximately 400 per cent since 1980. While the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) equity trading amounts to $26 billion per day, trading volume in all bond markets total roughly $350 billion per day (the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) press release 98-81). The vast majority of bond markets transactions occur in over-the-counter dealer markets.
An important issue for academics and market participants is the liquidity and transparency of dealer market transactions. Recent finance literature argues that, at least in the equity markets, dealers may not provide competitive pricing of customer trades, compared to auctions markets. For example, Huang and Stoll (1996) find that execution costs are about twice as high on the NASDAQ dealer markets, compared to a matching sample of NYSE stocks. Roell (1992) shows that the execution costs in the London dealer market are higher than in the continental auctions markets.
The inefficiency of dealer pricing is, perhaps, of even greater concern in bond markets than in equity markets. This is because of the lack of price transparency in the former markets since there is no centralized location reporting quotes or trade prices. For inactively traded bonds, different dealers may provide different quotes for the same bond. 2 The SEC has proposed rules to enhance the transparency of the corporate bond market. One measure would require dealers to report all transactions in U.S. corporate bonds and preferred stocks to the NASD and to develop systems to receive and redistribute transaction prices on an immediate basis (SEC press release 98-81).
In the current paper, we estimate the realized bid-ask spreads in the U.S. corporate, municipal and government bond markets for the years 1995 to 1997, based on newly available transactions data for the bond dealer markets. As of 1993, these three bond markets were about two-thirds of the dollar value of the U.S. debt markets (Fabozzi, 1996) . We compare the bid-ask spread across the three markets, after controlling for the risk of trading bonds, the level of their trading activity, the transparency of the market and issuer-2 See Schultz (1998) for a description of the pricing mechanism in corporate bond markets. In September 1998, the House Commerce committee and the Finance and Hazardous Materials subcommittee began holding hearings on whether investors have adequate information about prices when considering investments in the bond market. The title of the hearing: "Improving price competition for mutual funds and bonds." specific characteristics. As the three markets vary with respect to the control factors, a cross-market comparison is a natural experiment in studying the effects of these factors on market liquidity.
In terms of credit risk, U.S. Treasury securities are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, and so are virtually free of credit risk. Corporate bonds may suffer from significant credit risk. For example, in 1992, high risk or junk corporate bonds (rated below Baa by Moody's) were about 23% of volume (Bencivenga, 1995) . Municipal bonds have intermediate credit risk due to the financial fragility of some municipals, and the proliferation of innovative bond issues with uncertain legal bondholder rights. trillion of debt from 10,000 issues and $802 billion of debt from 70,000 separate issuers, respectively (Fabozzi, 1996) . The large issue sizes in the U.S. Treasury markets imply that the secondary market is highly liquid, with large trading volumes and narrow bid-ask spreads, as shown in Fleming and Sarkar (1998) . Further, the secondary market in U.S. Treasuries is a round-the-clock market, whereas the corporate and municipal bond markets are not---a further indication of the robust trading activity in U.S. Treasuries.
In terms of market transparency, a recent review of the debt markets by the SEC found that the government bond market is highly transparent, that price transparency has improved in the municipal bond market, 4 but is still inadequate in the corporate bond market.
Our first set of results relate to the distribution of the realized bid-ask spread, defined as the difference between the average buy price and the average sell price per bond per day. The spreads are reported on the basis of a $100 par value. We find that the mean spread is the highest in the municipal bond market at 22 cents, followed by the corporate bond market at about 21 cents and the government bond market at 11 cents. The spread is generally higher for bonds with lower Moody's ratings, and lower in 1997 than in the earlier years for all markets. In the corporate and municipal markets, the spread appears to have decreased in each successive year of our sample.
Regarding bond characteristics, municipal bonds have the highest time to maturity, and the lowest trading volume of the three markets. Consistent with market perception that the government bond market is the most liquid sector, government bonds have the lowest age since issuance, and the highest trading volume of the three markets. In all markets, the average time to maturity of bonds is intermediate, between 9 and 11 years, while the average age of bonds varies between 2.75 years and 3.5 years.
Next, we study the determinants of the bid-ask spread separately in the corporate, government and the municipal bond markets. Specifically, using the robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique, we find that liquidity is an important determinant of the realized bid-ask spread all three markets. Specifically, in all markets, the realized bid-ask spread decreases in the trading volume.
Additionally, risk factors are important in the corporate and municipal markets. In these markets, the bid-ask spread increases in the remaining-time-to-maturity of a bond. The corporate bond spread also increases in credit risk and the age of a bond. The municipal bond spread increases in the after-tax bond yield.
Additionally, the bid-ask spread is lower in 1997 compared to the previous two years--by 7 cents for corporate bonds and 10 cents for municipal bonds. However, this is not the case in the government bond market. The result is consistent with the idea that transparency in the corporate and municipal bond markets has improved, perhaps as a consequence of increased regulatory scrutiny.
In each bond market, there are unique factors important for determining the bid-ask spread for that market only. For corporate bonds, the bid-ask spread increases with the age of the bond since issuance.
Also, the estimated bid-ask spread for AAA and AA rated corporate bonds are about 21 cents lower than corporate junk bonds (i.e., bonds rated Ba or below by Moody's). For municipal bonds, the bid-ask spread is positively related to the annual yield. Since the yield is a before-tax return, we interpret the result to mean that the bid-ask spread is negatively related to the extent of tax subsidy implicit in municipal bond yields.
Is the bid-ask spread different for the three markets, after controlling for its significant determinants?
We pool observations from all markets, and estimate a common model. The result shows that the spread in the municipal bond market is higher by 9 cents compared to government bonds, even after the reduction in spreads in 1997, but corporate bond spreads are not. A pair-wise comparison of markets confirms this result.
Specifically, the municipal bond spread is higher than the corporate bond spread by 8 cents, but the corporate bond spread is not different from the government bond spread. This result is robust to alternative specifications that take into account the unique determinant of spreads in the government sector.
Following Schultz (1998), we examine whether large dealers earn higher bid-ask spreads compared to smaller dealers. We find that the ten largest dealers earn higher spreads in the corporate and municipal bond markets, but not in the government bond market. The ten largest dealers generally trade different bonds than the other dealers in all three markets. Bonds traded by the ten largest dealers in the corporate and municipal bond markets are significantly riskier (higher duration) and more active (lower bond age) compared to bonds traded by smaller dealers. After controlling for these differences, the ten largest corporate bond dealers earn 15 cents more than other dealers, but the municipal bond bid-ask spread is the same for all dealers. We do not find any differences in the bid-ask spread for the trades of the ten largest institutions compared to those of the smaller institutions.
In related work, Schultz (1998) studies the corporate bond market and Hong and Warga (1998) study the corporate and government bond markets using the same data set as ours. Schultz (1998) finds that the bid-ask spread is lower for larger sized trades and for larger institutions, but that it is not affected by relationships between dealers and institutions. Hong and Warga (1998) find no apparent biases in exchange transactions and dealer-market quotes relative to transactions in the dominant dealer market. The authors conclude that effective spreads (calculated by matching quotes with transactions) for the ABS traded corporate bonds are found to be similar to effective spreads for dealer market transactions, although dealer market spreads exhibit substantially higher variability.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss our data and methodology.
In section 3, we describe the sample distributions of the bid-ask spread and various bond characteristics.
In section 4, we analyze the determinants of the bid-ask spread in the three markets, and compare the spread across them. In section 5, we study whether the bid-ask spread is different for the largest dealers and institutions. Finally, the conclusions are presented in section 6.
Data and Methodology
After describing the data in section 2A, we discuss the theoretical determinants of bid-ask spread in bond markets and our empirical proxies in section 2B.
A. Data Description
Our bond transaction data set is comprised of individual bond transactions by insurance companies.
From 1995, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)---the regulatory body overseeing the insurance industry---started requiring the insurance companies to report their securities transactions on the Schedule D filings. Accordingly, the insurance companies must provide information pertaining to the total cost of transaction, the number of bond contracts purchased or sold and the date of transaction. We obtain a record of such transactions from Capital Access International (CAI), who, in turn, obtains it from A.M. Best. CAI then cleans the data by verifying the bonds transacted based on available information.
The basic data set used in the paper comprises of daily bond transaction records of insurance companies. The data is available from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1997. Each record comprises of the transaction date, an eight-digit bond number that identifies the bond, the total dollar value of the transaction, the number of contracts traded and an indication as to whether the order is a buy or a sell order. The original sample consists of 453,481 individual transactions by insurance companies in the three market sectors:
Corporate, Government and Municipal.
We purchase, also from CAI, additional information about the bonds in our sample, including the credit rating of each bond from Moody's and Standard and Poor's (S&P), the credit sector of issuer (e.g., whether the bond was issued by an industrial company), the issue date, and maturity date. Hong and Warga (1998) and Schultz (1998) 
B. Discussion of the Empirical Determinants of Bond Market Bid-Ask Spreads
In the contingent claims model of Merton (1973) , the value of corporate debt depends on the riskfree rate, provisions in the bond indenture (such as maturity date, coupon rate, and call provisions) and the probability of default. Based on research in the equity markets, 7 we expect the bid-ask spread to be related to the bond price and, therefore, to the determinants of debt value as indicated in Merton (1973) . We control for the default risk in two ways: by creating dummy variables based on Moody's credit ratings; and, for the corporate sector, by the yield spread, defined as the difference between the bond yield and the 91 day Treasury Bill rate. The yield spread is the market's perception of the credit risk of a corporate bond. We do not control for the coupon rate or the risk-free rate in the regressions because these variables are highly correlated with our other explanatory variables.
The bid-ask spread is related to the risk of trading a security since it affects dealers' price risk when adjusting their inventory (Grossman and Miller, 1988) . To estimate this effect, we use the term to maturity, or the remaining life of a bond, as a proxy for the bond price volatility. Since market yields change over the life of a bond, the price volatility increases with the term to maturity. The maturity term is obtained by calculating the number of years from a bond's transactions date till the maturity date of a non-callable bond.
Callable bonds are omitted from our sample.
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The risk of trading a bond is also related to its expected liquidity. Greater liquidity makes it easy to buy and sell bonds at short notice, and reduces the price risk dealers face in making inventory adjustments.
We use trading volume as a proxy for liquidity, and distinguish between the dollar buy volume per-bond-perday and the dollar sell volume per-bond-per-day. The practice of many institutions is to hold bonds to maturity and then reinvest the principal. Hence bond sales may be primarily information driven, causing the bid-ask spread to increase (Kyle (1985) , Easley and O'Hara (1987) ), whereas purchases may be primarily liquidity driven, causing the bid-ask spread to fall. Research on equity trades of institutions also find an asymmetric effect of purchases and sales on transactions costs (see, for example, Keim and Madhavan (1997) and Madhavan and Smidt (1993) ).
For the corporate bond market, it is often suggested that a younger bond may be traded more frequently, and has lower spreads resulting from greater liquidity. 8 We also used other measures of bond price volatility, including the Macaulay duration (DURATION), which captures the effect of the change in the price of a bond for a small change in its yield, and convexity (CONVEXITY) to capture the curvature or the convexity of a bond. The three measures, MATURITY, DURATION and CONVEXITY, are highly correlated, and so cannot be used together. We use MATURITY because it the most reliable. DURATION and CONVEXITY may be subject to measurement errors, since we calculate them on the basis of the annual bond yield. The yield is not in our data, and we estimate it using the semi annual coupon payments and the accrued interest payment from the previous coupon interest date.
In the bond markets, each market sector is divided into categories that reflect common economic characteristics. It is implicitly assumed that each issuer category has a different ability to meet their contractual obligations. For the corporate bond market, we use the dummy variables INDSER, BANKFIN and UTILITES to control for bonds issued by the services and industrial sectors, banking and finance companies, and utilities, respectively. For the municipal bond market, we use the dummy variables HCARE and UTILITIES to control for health care and utility bonds, respectively.
Finally, changes in the market structure may affect the bid-ask spread. In particular, if the market has become more transparent over time, the bid-ask spread may increase or decrease, depending upon which trader group is affected most. Theory generally predicts that uninformed traders prefer greater transparency since they are less likely to be pooled with informed traders, whereas large liquidity traders and informed traders like less transparency (Grossman, 1988; Madhavan, 1995; Pagano and Roell, 1996) . Dealers also like less transparency, since it reduces price competition with other dealers (Naik, Neuberger and Viswanathan, 1994) . We control for changes in the structure of these markets through the dummy variable 1997, which has the value one if a transaction occurred in 1997 and is zero otherwise.
Bid-Ask Spreads, Volatility and Liquidity: Descriptive Statistics
A.
Bid-ask Spreads in the Corporate, Government and Municipal Bond Markets
We calculate the realized bid-ask spreads per-bond-per-day as follows. For every bond with at least one buy and one sell transaction in a day, we compute the average buying and selling price per bond per day. The spread per bond per day is the difference between the average selling price per bond from the average buying price for that bond. We have 10,462 observations on the bid-ask spread per bond per day in the three market sectors.
The realized spreads are a noisy estimate of transaction costs, since trades take place at different times during the day. Since our data is not time-stamped within a day, we cannot condition on the transactions time. Additionally, the fact that we need to have at least one buy and one sell of a bond on a given day to calculate the spread dictates that our spread estimates are mainly applicable to relatively active bonds. Table 1A provides the sample distributions of the bid-ask spread for the three market sectors. All spreads are reported on the basis of a $100 par value. The mean spread is highest for the municipal bond sector at 22 cents, followed by the corporate bond markets at 21 cents, and least for the government bond markets at 11 cents. The mean volume-weighted spread on AAA-rated bonds and junk bonds are 21 cents and 24.33 cents per $100 par value, but the difference is not statistically significant. These numbers are higher than those in Hong and Warga (1998), who report an average volume-weighted spread of 13.28 cents per $100 par value for investment grade corporate bonds, and 19.13 cents for high yield bonds. But, they are lower than the volume-weighted spread of 26.2 cents reported in Schultz (1998).
To check for the robustness of our spread measures, we present, in Table 1B , the corresponding volume-weighted daily dollar spreads. Specifically, the mean volume-weighted dollar spread in the corporate sector is 21.5 cents on a $100 par value basis. Similarly, in the municipal sector, the mean volumeweighted dollar spread is about 22 cents, followed by that in the government sector at about 8 cents. Clearly, these estimates closely resemble the raw spreads reported in Table 1A and, for brevity, we concentrate the remainder of our analysis on the dollar raw spreads alone.
Among the credit sectors, utility sector bonds have higher spreads than the sample average, whereas the industry/services sector s and the banking/financial sectors have lower spreads than the sample average.
Industrial and service sector bonds are about 45 per cent of bonds traded in our sample, with banking /finance company and utility issues being about 32 and 14 per cent of the sample, respectively. By comparison, in 1988, industrials and banking/finance companies accounted for about 46% and 37% of new bond offerings.
In the government bond sector, the median raw and volume-weighted spread per bond per day, on the basis of a $100 par, are 11.1 cents and 8.17 cents, respectively. By comparison, in Hong and Warga (1998), the mean volume-weighted spread for Government/Agency securities is 1.84 cents per $100 par value. Our mean fractional volume-weighted spread is 0.1 per cent. For 1993, Fleming and compute fractional volume-weighted spreads for all Treasury securities by maturity. Their estimates range from effectively zero per cent for the 13-week bill to 0.02 per cent for the 30-year Treasury bond. For the 10-year note (closest to the average maturity of our sample), the fractional spread (not reported) is 0.02 per cent.
Finally, for the municipal bond market, the mean raw and volume-weighted spread is 23 cents and 22.93 cents. Among the different credit sectors, spreads are highest for health-care bonds at 23.83 cents and lower than average for utility bonds at 11.43 cents. Our estimate is consistent with available evidence of spreads for institutional investor spreads in the municipal bond market. According to Fabozzi (1996) , dealer spreads vary substantially between institutional investors and retail investors. Fabozzi (1996) reports that spreads for institutional investors rarely exceed 50 cents per $100 par value, while those for retail investors vary between 25 cents on large blocks of actively traded stocks to $4 per $100 par value for odd-lot sales of inactive issues. Table 2 provides the sample distributions of variables that may help predict the level of spreads in the three markets. We find that volatility, as measured by the time-to-maturity, is highest in the municipal bond sector, and about the same in the other two markets. 9 Trading activity, as measured by the dollar buy and sell volumes, is least in the municipal bond market, followed by the corporate and government bond markets, respectively.
B. Volatility and Liquidity in the Fixed Income Markets
The maturity level is intermediate in all three sectors, consistent with the change in business practices of the insurance companies who place increased emphasis on shorter-term-oriented term life and other policies instead of more traditional whole-life policies and investments in long-term bonds. In the Municipal Bond market, the time-to-maturity is 11.29 years, which is at the upper range of the intermediate maturities.
In the corporate bond market, the average time to maturity is 9.18 years, similar to the median time to maturity of 8.48 years reported in Schultz (1998) . 10 In the Treasury Bond market, the average timeto-maturity is 8.63 years, slightly less than the corporate bond sector.
The average dollar value of a transaction is the largest in the government sector, at about $7.7 million for purchases and about $8.5 million for sales. In comparison, Fleming and Sarkar (1998) report the trade size for the 10-year Treasury bond note as $5.70 million. For the municipal bond market, the average dollar transaction is about $3.4 million for purchases and $3.9 million for sales. In the corporate bond market, the mean dollar trade is about $4.40 million, both for sales and purchases, which is larger than the median trade size of $1.513 million reported in Schultz (1998). The size of insurance company transactions in our sample appears to be fairly representative of the size of the average dealer market transaction. As evidence, the average size of a corporate bond trade on the New York Stock Exchange was $20,000 in 1997, or less than one-half of one per cent of the size of a corporate bond trade in our sample. This is similar to the trade size of all transactions on the over-the-counter market, relative to the exchange markets.
The mean age of the bonds is lowest in the Government bond market, at 2.75 years, and about 3.5 years in the other two markets.
A Comparison the Bid-Ask Spread in the Corporate, Government and Municipal Bond Markets

A. Determinants of the Bid-Ask Spread for the Corporate, Government and Municipal Bond Markets using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation
In the previous section, we saw that the three sectors differ in the level of trading activity and measures of risk, and these differences may account for the differences in the spread. For example, the municipal bond sector has the highest mean spread but also the lowest level of trading volume and the highest volatility. In section B, we separately examine the set of factors that determine the bid-ask spread in each market. In section C, we directly compare the bid-ask spread in the three sectors, based on our results in section B.
Preliminary diagnostics indicated the presence of significant heteroskedasticity in the error term of an equation of the form of (1). Since the functional form of heteroskedasticity in the error terms is unknown, to proceed ahead with an OLS-type estimation with an assumption of the functional form, would in all likelihood leave us with a mis-specified model with its associated problems. To ensure that our results are robust to this possibility, we estimate the price change regression by the more robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique proposed by Hansen (1982) . where, for a specific bond on day t, the explanatory variables are defined as follows.
Spread t : the daily bid-ask spread for the bond in dollars.
Maturity t : the time-to-maturity for the bond in years. A higher value is likely to increase volatility and, therefore, spreads.
Age t : the time in years between the bond transaction date and its issuance date.
BVolume t : the log of the daily dollar value of purchases for the bond. We do not include both purchases and sales in the same regression, since the two variables are highly correlated. However, in a later specification, we substitute the log of the daily dollar value of sales for BVolume.
1997 t : a dummy variable taking the value one if the bond traded in the year 1997, and 0 otherwise. The transaction year dummy is included to control for structural changes in the market. As stated in the introduction, these markets have been under increasing public scrutiny in the past few years and several regulatory changes have been proposed. It may be that these external events have caused changes in dealer behavior, as Christie et al (1994) have documented for the NASDAQ market.
Additional dummy variables: for both the corporate and municipal sectors, we control for credit risk with dummy variables for bonds with Moody's ratings in the categories A1 to A3. For example, the dummy A1 is one for bonds rated A1 by Moody's, and zero otherwise. Also, we define a Utility Sector dummy with value one for bonds issued by Utility companies, and zero otherwise.
For the corporate sector alone, we include additional dummy variables for bonds with Moody's ratings BAA1 to BAA3. We also define the dummy variable AAA & AA, which is one for bonds, rated AAA or AA by Moody's, and zero otherwise. We combine these bonds because we only have 48 AAA rated bonds in the corporate bond sample. The omitted rating category is Junk, those bonds rated Ba or below by Moody's.
For the municipal sector alone, we include a dummy variable for bonds with Moody's rating AA, and another dummy variable Below A3, which is one for bonds rated below A3 by Moody's, and zero otherwise. This category combines bonds rated BAA1 and below since the number of bonds in each of the combined categories was too small. The omitted rating category is AAA, those bonds rated AAA by Moody's.
B. GMM Regression Results for Individual Markets
The second column of Table 3 , titled Model 1, shows the results of estimating regression (1) for the corporate bond sector. The adjusted R-square is 2.28 per cent and estimated coefficients of all the nondummy explanatory variables are significant. Two of the estimated dummy coefficients are significant as well. Of the significant estimates, the coefficient on Maturity is positive, indicating that the spread increases by 2 cents for every one-year increase in the remaining time to maturity of a bond. The coefficient on Age is also positive, indicating that the spread increases by one cent when the bond ages by one more year. An additional $1 million purchase decreases the spread by about 7 cents, consistent with the idea that bond purchases are primarily viewed as liquidity events. Of the credit rating dummies, the coefficient on the combined AAA/AA dummy is negative, and indicates that the spread on these bonds is 21 cents lower relative to corporate junk bonds. The remaining credit rating dummies are not significant. Finally, the bid-ask spread for corporate bonds decreased by 7 cents in 1997, relative to the previous two years. The utility sector dummy is not significant.
The second column of Table 4 , titled Model 1, shows the results for estimating regression (1) for the government bond sector. The adjusted R-square is essentially zero. While the estimated coefficients have the predicted signs, none are significant. These results indicate that our specification cannot capture the determinants of the realized bid-ask spread in the government sector.
The second column of Table 5 , titled Model 1, shows the results for estimating regression (1) for the municipal bond sector. The adjusted R-square is 1.87 per cent. Similar to the corporate bond market, estimated coefficients on the volatility and liquidity variables are significant. The bid-ask spread increases by one cent with every additional year in the Maturity, and the spread decreases by 2 cents for an additional $1 million purchase. This further confirms our conjecture that bond purchases are viewed as liquidity events.
Similar to the corporate market, the bond spread was lower in 1997 by 11 cents relative to the previous two years. Unlike the corporate sector, the Age of the bond is not a significant determinant of the bid-ask spread.
Further, none of the credit sector dummies have significant coefficients.
In our second regression specification, we reestimate regression (1) using GMM, but after 
where SVolume t is the log of the daily dollar value of sales of a bond on day t and the additional dummy variables are the same set described earlier for Model 1.
Our conjecture is that the sale of corporate and municipal bonds may be information driven, leading dealers to widen the bid-ask spread. This conjecture is not supported by the results for the corporate and municipal bond sectors, presented in the third column (titled Model 2) of Tables 3 and 5. The coefficient of
SVolume is negative and not significant in both markets, and its effect in these two markets is to lower the adjusted R-square. However, the sign and significance of the remaining variables are unaffected in both markets. In the government sector, since there is no private information, we interpret SVolume as a liquidity variable. The results are in the third column, titled Model 2, of Table 4 . Consistent with our interpretation, the coefficient of SVolume is negative and significant, and its effect is to increase the adjusted R-square to where Yield Spread t is defined as the difference between the yield on the bond on day t and the three month Treasury Bill rate on day t. We calculate the corporate yield on the basis of the accrued interest convention used in the market. The Yield Spread measures the market's valuation of credit risk, and so we expect the bid-ask spread to increase with it.
The results are in column four (titled Model 3) of where Annual Yield is just the yield of the bond on day t. Since the Yield is a before-tax return, we hope to capture tax subsidies embedded in the municipal bonds with this variable. A lower yield implies a higher tax subsidy, which makes the bond more attractive, and so we expect the Annual Yield to be positively associated with the bid-ask spread.
The results are in column four (titled Model 3) of Table 5 . As predicted, the estimated coefficient of Annual Yield is positive and coefficient, indicating that the bid-ask spread decreases by 4 cents for every one per cent decrease in the yield. Estimates that were significant in Models 1 and 2 remain so. The adjusted Rsquare improves, and the intercept is no longer significant, indicating a better fit for Model 3 compared to the where Term Structure t is defined as the difference between the yield on the government bond on day t and the three month Treasury Bill rate on day t. The Term Structure measures the market's valuation of maturity risk, and so we expect the bid-ask spread to increase with it. The result is reported in column four (titled Model 3) of Table 4 . Although the adjusted R-square increases significantly from 1.04 per cent in Model 2 to 3.86 per cent, the estimated coefficient of Term Structure is not significant, although it has the right sign.
C. A Comparison of the Bid-Ask Spread in the Corporate, Government and Municipal Bond Markets --A Pooled Regression Approach
In this section, we pool observations across the three market sectors to test whether --controlling for volatility, credit risk and liquidity --bid-ask spreads are different in the three sectors. A potential problem with pooling is that it assumes a common set of variables explaining variations in the bid-ask spread in all markets, whereas the results from section B indicate some differences in the set of explanatory variables across markets. Our approach is to start with a set of explanatory variables that were found to be significant in all different regression specifications used in the corporate and municipal markets, and later check whether the results are sensitive to different specifications for the government sector. This leads us to use Model 1 as our initial specification.
Accordingly, we estimate (1) with the pooled data. The additional explanatory variables are a dummy for Corporate sector bonds and another dummy for the Municipal sector bonds. The coefficients of these dummies indicate whether corporate and municipal bonds have higher bid-ask spreads than government bonds, after controlling for other factors. To avoid collinearity between these dummies and the intercept, we omit the intercept term. The remaining explanatory variables are the same as before, except for the credit rating dummies. We define a dummy for every rating category except AAA. Thus, we start with the AA dummy and end with the Junk dummy, which includes all ratings categories Ba and below.
The results are reported in column two (titled Model 1) of Table 6 . The bid-ask spread for municipal sector bonds is higher by 9 cents per $100 par value compared to government bonds, but bid-ask spreads for corporate and government bonds are not statistically different. In addition, bid-ask spreads were lower for all sectors by 7 cents in 1997, compared to the previous two years. Estimates of the time to maturity, the age of the bond, and the BAA3 dummy are also significant, and have the correct signs.
D. Robustness Checks
From the results in section 5B, Model 1 is a poor fit in the government sector, but a good fit for the Corporate and Municipal bond sectors. So, we repeat the analysis of section 5C, except that we pool observations from the Corporate and the Municipal markets only. We drop the Corporate sector dummy and retain the Municipal sector dummy. For consistency, we require that the bid-ask spread in the municipal sector should be about 9 cents higher than in the corporate sector. Further, the remaining estimates should be stable in their signs, magnitude and significance.
The results for this exercise are reported in column three (titled Model 2) of Table 6 , and they are consistent with our requirements. The bid-ask spread in the municipal bond sector is significantly higher than that in the corporate sector by 8 cents, and the remaining estimates are robust with respect to sign, magnitude and significance.
As a further robustness check, we reestimate (1) for the Corporate and Government bond markets only, but replacing BVolume with TVolume, the log of the total daily dollar value of transactions. This substitution is meant to account for the fact that, in the individual market regressions, the estimated coefficient of BVolume is negative and significant but the estimated coefficient of SVolume is not significant for the Corporate bond market; while the opposite is true for the Government bond market. For this specification, we only use the Corporate sector dummy. For consistency, we require that the coefficient on the Corporate sector dummy should not be different from zero. The results, which are reported in column four (titled Model 3) of Table 6 , show that this is indeed the case.
As a final robustness check, we estimate the bid-ask spread in the corporate and municipal markets as a seemingly unrelated regression system (SUR). We use the estimates of the SUR regressions as initial values in a system-GMM specification. An advantage of the SUR method is that the bid-ask spread in each market can be explained by the set of explanatory variables best suited for that market, and yet the common information in each market is also accounted for by the contemporaneous correlation between the error terms. Thus, by strategically combining the SUR and GMM techniques, we are able to simultaneously account for both the heteroskedastic error terms as well as the contemporaneous correlation in the error terms across the two markets.
To implement the SUR estimation technique, we need to create a new sample based on a single daily average number for each relevant variable in each market sector. 11 This implies that we consider only those days when there is trading in all relevant markets. In the same spirit, the credit ratings are assigned numerical values to obtain an average credit rating for different bonds trading on the same day. As the regression specification, we use Model 1 from Tables 3 and 5 . The results (not reported, but available upon request) are qualitatively similar to those found earlier. Specifically, the bid-ask spread that cannot be predicted from the SUR/GMM estimation is higher by about 2 cents for the municipal market, relative to the corporate market.
Thus, the extensive robustness tests performed in this section appear to attest to the stability of our regression estimates in the three markets
E. The Factors That Determine Spreads In The Three Market Sectors
In summary, what are the relevant factors determining realized bond spreads in the three market sectors examined in this paper? Liquidity, as measured by Bvolume/ SVolume in all three market sectors and also by Age in the corporate sector are important determinants of spread. Further, the Maturity risk factor appears to be an important determinant of spreads in all three market sectors although its impact on the government sector is relatively indirect compared to the corporate and municipal sectors. Not surprisingly, credit risk is an important determinant of spreads in the corporate and municipal sectors. Finally, the municipal sector has an additional tax factor in Yield that significantly determines the spread in this market.
The Effect of Large Institutions and Dealers on the Bid-Ask Spread
In this section, we examine the effects of large institutions and large dealers on the realized bid-ask spreads. Keim and Madhavan (1997) document significant differences in equity trading costs across institutions even after adjusting for differences in trading styles. Cao, Choe and Hathaway (1997) and Corwin (1998) document significant heterogeneity among NYSE specialist firms. In a similar vein, the bidask spread for large bond dealers and institutions may differ from smaller dealers and institutions. Table 7 Table 8 lists the top bond dealers with at least 50% of the market share of the average trading revenues in each of the three market sectors. The total and average dealer revenues are calculated as the difference between dealer sales and dealer purchases. It takes fewer dealers than institutions to account for a 50% market share, which suggests that there may be greater concentration among dealers than among institutions in each of the market sectors.
A. The Bid-Ask Spread for the Ten Largest Dealers and the Others
We calculate the bid-ask spread for the top-10 dealers by dollar value traded and those for the remaining dealers in each market sector. For bonds with at least one buy and one sell per dealer each day, we subtract the average sell price of each bond per day per dealer from the average buy price of the same bond over the same day by the same dealer. The average bid-ask spread per top-10 dealer per bond per day is calculated by averaging the bid-ask spread per dealer per bond per day over all top-10 dealers. The average bid-ask spread for the non-top-10 dealers is similarly calculated.
Panel A of Table 9 presents the bid-ask spread for the ten largest dealers and the remaining dealers in each market sector, identified from the lists in Table 8 . We use a Wilcoxon non-parametric test of equality of medians to test whether the bid-ask spread is statistically different between the two dealer groups. In the Corporate sector (panel A), the mean bid-ask spread is 26 cents for the ten largest dealers and 13 cents for the other dealers, and the difference is significant at the 0.01 level. In the Municipal sector, the mean bid-ask spread is 20 cents for the ten largest dealers and 19 cents for the others, a difference also significant at the 0.01 level. Finally, in the Government sector, there is no statistical difference between the bid-ask spread of the top-10 dealers and the rest.
B. The Bid-Ask Spread for the Ten Largest Institutions and the Others
Panel B of Table 9 presents the bid-ask spread for trades of the top-10 institutions and those of other institutions, in each market sector. The top-10 institutions in each market sector are identified from Table 7 .
The bid-ask spread is not statistically different (at the 0.10 level) for the ten largest institutions and others in the corporate and government sectors. For example, in the Corporate sector, the mean bid-ask spread is about 14 cents for the top-10 and 15 cents for the non-top-10 institutions. In the Government sector, the mean bid-ask spread is 4 cents for with top-10 institutions and 9 cents for the others. In the municipal sector, the mean bid-ask spread is 25 cents for the top-10 institutions and about 16 cents for the non-top-10 institutions. Although the numbers for the municipal sector are distinct from the other two market sectors, it should be emphasized that, before drawing any definitive conclusions, a multivariate analysis of the bid-ask spreads, controlling for its various determinants, needs to be performed. We do this in section 5D.
C. Characteristics of Bonds Traded by the Ten Largest Dealers and Others
From panel A of Table 9 , we see that the spreads associated with the top-10 dealer transactions are significantly higher that those associated with the non-top-10 dealers. It is likely that this difference could arise from a significantly different (and riskier) universe of bonds traded by the top-10 dealers.
To investigate if the top-10 dealer population does indeed trade a different universe of bonds than does the non-top-10 population, we present in Table 10 a break down of the percentage of common and distinct bonds transacted by each group of dealers within each market sector. Table 10 shows that, in the Corporate sector, only about 8% of the bonds are common to both groups, the ten largest dealers and the others. In the Government and municipal sectors, the per cent of commonly traded bonds are about 30% and 2%, respectively. Thus, the top-10 dealers appear, for the most part, to be dealing in bonds that are distinct from those traded by the rest of the dealers.
To investigate if the top-10 dealer population trade inherently riskier bonds compared to the non-top-10 dealers, we present, in Table 11 , summary statistics of the specific bond characteristics traded by the two groups of dealers for each market sector. In the corporate sector (panel A), bonds traded by the top-10 dealers have higher yields, higher duration, higher convexity, longer time to maturity, lower age and somewhat lower coupon rates. In the government sector, characteristics of bonds traded by the top-10 dealers and the rest do not appear to be different. In the municipal sector (panel C), the annual duration of the top-10 dealer executed bonds is higher, and the bonds are younger. Thus, the evidence suggests that, in the corporate and municipal sectors, the top-10 dealers execute bonds that are riskier but more active (younger) than the non-top-10 dealers. However, the evidence for the municipal bonds is weaker than that for corporate bonds. While riskier bonds would command higher spreads, younger bonds are more liquid and, ceteris paribus, would argue for lower spreads. The resultant higher spreads observed for the top-10 dealer executed bonds would then be the net of the two counteracting forces.
D. Is the Bid-Ask Spread Higher for Large Dealers and Institutions?
In Table 12 , we examine whether the ten largest dealers earn higher spreads, after controlling for differences in the characteristics of bonds traded by the dealer groups. We regress the realized bid-ask spread per bond for each dealer on a dummy variable that equals one if the dealer belongs to the Top 10 group, and is zero otherwise. In addition, we include variables that proxy for the risk and liquidity of the bonds. The regression specifications are the ones earlier found to provide the best explanation of the bid-ask spread in each sector (see Tables 3 to 5) . To be specific, they correspond to model one for the corporate and municipal sectors, and model 2 for the government sector.
The results show that the ten largest corporate bond dealers earn 15 cents per $100 par value more than the other dealers, after controlling for bond characteristics. This result does not change when we also control for the other bond characteristics reported in Table 11 , such as duration, convexity, the coupon rate and the annual yield. In the other two markets, the differences between the bid-ask spreads of the ten largest dealers and the rest are not significant.
The results for large institutions (not reported) are consistent with the results in Panel B of Table 9 .
After controlling for bond characteristics, the bid-ask spread is not different for the ten largest institutions compared to the others.
In summary, our multivariate results substantiate the univariate results of section C and attest to the robustness of our conclusions.
6.
Conclusion
In the current paper, we estimate the liquidity of the U.S. corporate, municipal and government bond markets for the years 1995 to 1997, based on newly available transactions data pertaining to the bond dealer markets. Since these three markets vary with respect to transparency and risk, a cross-market comparison is a natural experiment in studying the effects of these factors on market liquidity.
We find that, on a $100 par value basis, the mean spread is the highest in the municipal bond market at about 22 cents, followed by the corporate bond market at about 21 cents and the government bond market at about 11 cents. The spread is generally higher for bonds with lower Moody's ratings, and lower in 23 1997 than in the earlier years for all markets. In the corporate and municipal markets, the spread appears to have decreased in each successive year.
We examine the determinants of the realized bid-ask spread using the GMM technique and find that liquidity is an important determinant of the realized bid-ask spread all three markets. Specifically, in all markets, the realized bid-ask spread decreases in the trading volume. Additionally, risk factors are important in the corporate and municipal markets. In these markets, the bid-ask spread increases in the remainingtime-to-maturity of a bond. The corporate bond spread also increases in credit risk and the age of a bond.
The municipal bond spread increases in the after-tax bond yield. Additionally, the bid-ask spread is lower in 1997 compared to the previous two years--by 7 cents for corporate bonds and 10 cents for municipal bonds.
However, this is not the case in the government bond market. The result is consistent with the idea that transparency in the corporate and municipal bond markets has improved, perhaps as a consequence of increased regulatory scrutiny. Finally, in a pooled regression framework, we find that the municipal bond spread is higher than the government bond spread by about 9 cents per $100 par value, but the corporate bond spread is not.
We also find that the bid-ask spread for the ten largest dealers in our sample is statistically higher than that of other dealers in the corporate and the municipal bond markets. After controlling for differences in characteristics of bonds traded by the large dealers and others, we find that the corporate bond dealers earn 15 cents per $100 par value higher than the other dealers but, in the municipal bond market, the bid-ask spread is not different for the large dealers. 
Note:
*: statistically distinct at the 0.01 level using a Wilcoxon sign rank test of equality of the medians **: statistically distinct at the 0.05 level using a Wilcoxon sign rank test of equality of the medians ***: statistically distinct at the 0.10 level using a Wilcoxon sign rank test of equality of the medians 
The pairwise tests correspond to the "top 10" sample and the "Remaining Dealers" sample in each case.
